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LEGISLATION
Control of Corporate Indemnification:
A Proposed Statute
James H. Cheek, III*
The recent unprecedented increase in the number of suits filed
against corporate executives under the Jederal antitrust and
securities lats has again Jocused attention on the risks of executive
liabilit " and the corresponding problem of attracting top mlen as
corporate directors. Faced with this dilemma, corporations have
drafted byla'as providing Jbr the maximum indenification allowed
under applicable state law. The state legislatures, on the other
hand, have attempted to prevent misuse of the power to indemnij,
while at the same time trying to insure adequate protection Jbr
those who serve as directors. Mr. Cheek argues that the legislatures
have Jailed in their attempt to provide both directors and the
investing public with satisJactorv protection. He examines the two
most advanced provisions to date-the 1963 New York Statute and
the 1967 Delaware Statute-and then presents an approach which
he Jeels more adequately reconciles the confilicting interests of these
t1o groups.
I. INTRODUCTION
The indemnification of corporate personnel is not a new problem,
for its origin may be traced to the depression years following 1929
when for the first time many directors and officers were named
defendants in derivative suits and faced the possibility of large
financial losses. As the risks increased, so did the corporate fear not
only of personal liability but also of an inability to recruit responsible
persons to serve as directors. As a result, in the early 1940's,
corporations began to respond with bylaws intended to provide
protection by indemnity.'
* Assistant Dean and Instructor in Law, Vanderbilt University. A.B. Duke, 1964; LL.B.
Vanderbilt University, 1967: LL.M. Harvard University, 1968.
I. Between 1939 and 1942 there were reportedly 169 resolutions and amendments to
bylaws and articles of incorporation to provide for indemnification of directors and officers.
Most of these changes were justified to the stockholders as necessary to obviate the difficulty of
finding responsible persons willing to act as directors. Bates & Zuckert, Directors' Indemnir:
Corporate Policy or Public Polier. 20 HARV. Bus. REV. 244 (1942).
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Despite a flurry of early comment on this initial movement,2
concentrated study of the problem1  and enlightened statutory
provisions4 are only of recent vintage. The apathy exhibited toward
indemnity from the early 1940's to the early 1960's may well be
explained by the fantastic business growth of that period which left
little cause for complaint. Yet despite continued good business
conditions, concern over indemnification has again become
widespread. The fear of liability and of the inability to attract top
men as directors is still present; however, the fear is no longer based
upon suits arising from bad business conditions but is due to other
2. See. e.g.. id.; Hornstein, Directors' Expenses in Stockholders' Suits. 43 COLUSI. L.
REV. 301 (1943); Jervis, Corporate Agreements to Pay Directors' Lvpenses in Stockholders'
Suits. 40 COLULI. L. REV. 1192 (1940); Steadman & Garrett, Indenmification of Directors, 8
Bus. LAW. 2 (1953); Washington, Litigation -vpenses oJ C'orporate Directors in StocAholder'
Suits, 40 COLUIM. L. REV. 431 (1940).
3. See G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, INDEMNIFYING THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE (1963);
Bishop, Current Status oj Corporate Director's Right to Indeniification. 69 HARV. L. Rtv.
1057 (1956); Bishop, Indennification oj Corporate Directors. Ojicers and Employees, 20 Bus,
LAw. 833 (1965); Bishop, Vew Cure jor an Old Ailnent: Insurance Against Directors' and
Ojficers" Liability, 22 Bus. LAW. 92 (1966); Insurance Against Liabilities oj Directors and
Oficers-A Forum. 22 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 342, 353-56 (1967).
4. As of 1953, there were only sixteen states in which there was statutory authority
relating to the indemnification of directors. For a listing of those states, see Steadman &
Garrett, supra note 2, at 2. Today 43 states have statutes with indemnification provisions and 20
of those states have reformed their legislation since 1960. See ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.009(15)
(1968); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-198 (Supp. 1968); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-309 (1966);
CAL. CORP. CODE § 830 (Supp. 1968-69); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-2-1(15) (Supp. 1964);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-320 (Supp. 1966); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (Supp. 1967);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.13(14), (15) (Supp. 1968); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-717 (Supp. 1968) (effec-
tive April I, 1969); HAWAII REV. LAWS tit. 23, § 17 2 -2 3 (p) (Supp. 1965); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 25-202(9) (Supp. 1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.4(15) (1962); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-
3010 (Supp. 1968); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 271.125(11), 271.375 (1962); ME. REV. STAT. ANN, tit.
13, § 146 (Supp. 1968); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 64 (Supp. 1968); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch,
156B, § 67 (Supp. 1968); MICH. Co.IP. LAWS § 21.10(l) (Supp. 1963); MINN. STAT. ANN,
§ 301.09(7) (Supp. 1968); MISS. CODE ANN. § 5309-04(o) (Supp. 1967); MO. ANN. STAT.
§§ 351.355, 351.385(10) (1966); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 15-2204(o) (1967). NUB, RLv,
STAT. § 21-2004(15) (Supp. 1968); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.070(6) (1967); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:
3-5 (Supp. 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-24-4(o) (Supp. 1967); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§§ 721-26 (1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-19 to -21 (1965); N.D. CIUNT. COOL § 10-
19-04(15) (1960); OHIO REV. CoDE ANN. § 1701.13(E) (Baldwin Supp. 1967); ORE RLv.
STAT. § 57.030(15) (1963). PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 410 (Supp. 1968); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 7-9-12 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-12.2(18), 12-18.18 (Supp. 1968); S.D. StsS. LAWS
ch. 22, § 4(15) (1965); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-407 to -411 (Supp. 1968) (effective July
I. 1969); TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 2.02(A)(16) (1956); UTAhl COOE ANN. § 16-10-4(o)
(Supp. 1967); \,A. CODE ANN. § 13.1-3.1 (Supp. 1968); WASH RLV. CoDE ANN. § 23A.08-
.020(15) (Supp. 1968); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.04(14) (Supp. 1968); W. \A. CODU ANN.
§ 31-1-18a (Supp. 1966); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 17.36.4(o) (Supp. 1965). Additionally the
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico have indemnity provisions. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-904
(p) (Supp. 1968); P.R. LAvs ANN. tit. 14, § 1202(10) (Supp. 1962).
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more compelling factors, such as the increased hazards of liability
under the federal antitrust and securities laws. The recent liability
imposed on the executives of General Electric and Westinghouse as a
result of an antitrust violation acutely demonstrates the vulnerable
position of an executive under the antitrust laws Similarly, a major
source of executive peril has been the recent SEC victories in the
Texas Gulf Sulphur and BarChris cases6 and the Merrill Lynch
proceedings. 7 This concern with potential antitrust and securities
liability may be characterized as only one aspect of broader anxiety
over the increasingly strict judicial interpretation of the standards of
executive liability.8 This worry is multiplied when one considers the
unprecedented increase in the number of suits filed against executives.'
Faced with these growing risks of executive liability, more and
more corporations have drafted bylaws providing for indemnification
to the greatest extent allowable under the applicable state law. This
desire to isolate corporate management from personal liability,
however, raises serious public policy issues. Complete protection
against any liability is against the basic tenet of our judicial
system-that no man may place himself beyond the law. Thus,
legislatures have attempted to provide safeguards against the potential
misuse of the power to indemnify within a framework which will also
insure adequate protection for those who serve as directors. Most
statutes fail to erect a structure in which both the directors and the
investing public are satisfactorily protected, and only recently have
5. See. e.g., Green, Executives in Court, Wall Street Journal, June 29, 1966, at I, col. 6.
For a description of the trial in which the GE-Westinghouse executives were fined from $1000 to
S 12,500, see N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1961, at I, col. 4, cited in G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, supra
note 3, at I & n.I.
6. SEC. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); Escott v. BarChris Constr.
Co., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
7. In the Matter of Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
77, 629 (1968). See Carley, Insuring Executives, Wall Street Journal, Aug. 29, 1968, at I, col.
I.
8. The increased potentiality of liability due to the strictness of judicial interpretation is
evidenced by the changing standards of conduct in 16(b) and 1Ob-5 actions under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and in proxy contests. Additionally, more and more "outside" directors
are being held liable for failure to supervise the activities of others, even though they obviously do
not have the time to keep in close contact as "inside" directors do. See note 86 inJra and accom-
panying text.
9. This increase has been explained as a consequence of two closely related factors the
increase in the number and knowledge of stockholders and the contingent fee system. Green,
supra note 5, at 8, col. 2. Other reasons suggested for the increase in suits include the fact that
more information upon which one may base a suit is available due to the disclosure
requirements of the SEC and that statutory standards are becoming stricter. See Mace,
Directors and Officers Liability Insurance, 85 BANKING L.J. 39 (1968).
1969]
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legislatures become attuned to the need for new legislation,
particularly with respect to indemnity in connection with settlements
and with suits decided otherwise than on the merits. This awareness
has produced a greatly improved law of indemnification, although no
fully satisfactory solution has been formulated to date.
The ultimate aim of this article is to draft a statute which can cope
with the conflicting policies. Initially, however, one must focus upon
the historical development of the problem from early common law to
the most recent statutory provisions, for it is essential to meaningful
evaluation of the proposed statute that one understand the history of
the problem. Although the analysis of most statutes is limited to the
critical question of what limits are imposed upon the power of the
corporation to indemnify its personnel, a detailed comparative
analysis is presented in discussing the two most thoughtful provisions
enacted to date-the 1963 New York Statute 0 and the 1967 Delaware
Statute." In addition, consideration will be given to nonstatutory
means of resolving the indemnification problem, such as the use of
corporate-paid indemnity insurance.
II. THE COMMON LAW
A. Pre-Statutory Common Law
An examination of the case law which preceded the first statutory
reaction to the problem will be helpful for several reasons. First, such
authority explains in large part why statutes developed as they did.
Second, such authority is still viable and persuasive in jurisdictions
with no statutory provision and even in jurisdictions with an
indemnification provision where the provision is "non-exclusive" and
thus permits extra-statutory indemnification. Furthermore, by
studying the policy limits placed on indemnity at common law, one
may more accurately forecast the limits which a court today would
impose upon the power of statutory indemnification.
Where a director or officer had been unsuccessful in defending an
action in the right of the corporation 2 and had been adjudged guilty
of negligence or misconduct in the performance of his duties, courts
held with uniformity that there could be no reimbursement. These
courts reasoned that there was no justification for the corporation
10. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 721-26 (1963).
II. DhL. CODF ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (Supp. 1967).
12. Apparently no problem arose with indemnification in suits not in the right of the
corporation, for each case examined involved a derivative suit.
['VOL. 22
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paying the expenses of a guilty director who was not acting for the
benefit of the corporation.13  But where a director or officer had
successfully defended against the suit, confusion reigned. One court
simply held that where no guilt was found, it was not "improper or
unjust" that the corporation should reimburse the successful person.
Other judges, however, looked for concrete benefit to the corporation
and placed the burden upon the director or officer to show that some
benefit occurred 5 or that some interest of the corporation had been
threatened." Finally, some courts have refused to reimburse the
successful director or officer on the theory that the director or officer
as a corporate agent was acting illegally or outside the scope of his
authority."
The confusion reached its peak with the case of New York Dock
Company v. McCollum," which denied indemnification to
several directors who had been vindicated in a derivative suit." The
court reasoned that there could be no recovery where there was no
benefit to the corporation, and as a result, innocent directors were
forced to pay over $86,000 in attorneys' fees. Even more shocking to
the corporate world must have been the apparent opinion of the
referee that situations in which the corporation would reap a benefit
would rarely occur, since it would be almost impossible for a
company to benefit from defeating a suit brought in its own right."
13. See, e.g., Wickersham v. Crittenden, 106 Cal. 329, 39 P. 603 (1895) (no corporate
benefit where for individual use only); Hollander v. Breeze Corp., 131 N.J. Eq. 585, 26 A.2d 507
(Ch. 1941) (no benefit in personal defense); Apfel v. Auditore, 223 App. Div. 457, 228 N.Y.S.
489 (1928) (corporation not a party in interest). For other cases, see Washington, supra note 2,
at 433 n.7.
14. Figge v. Bergenthal, 130 Wis. 594, 109 N.W. 581 (1906) (allowed the use of corporate
funds to pay the attorneys' fees of a director innocent of fraud).
15. See. e.g., Griesse v. Lang, 37 Ohio App. 553, 175 N.E. 222 (1931); Jesse v. Four
Wheel Drive Auto Co., 177 Wis. 627, 189 N.W. 276 (1922). This analysis is not very helpful
since rarely would the defense provide the corporation with an affirmative benefit. Bishop, supra
note 3, at 106 1. But .%e note 20 in lra and accompanying text.
16. Esposito v. Riverside Sand & Gravel Co., 287 Mass. 185, 191 N.E. 363 (1934); Godley
v. Crandell & Godley Co., 181 App. Div. 75, 168 N.Y.S. 251 (1917).
17. DuPuy v. Crucible Steel Co., 288 F. 583 (W.l). Pa. 1923) (no recovery despite the
good faith and innocence of corporate agent where criminal charge not denied in statement of
claim). (J. Adams v. North Range Iron Co., 191 Minn. 55, 253 N.W. 3 (1934); Hoch v. Duluth
Brewing & Malting Co., 173 Minn. 374, 217 N.W. 503 (1928). Note that the converse of the
DuPuY agency principle should also be true; that is, if an agent is called upon by the principal
to do an act not manifestly illegal and he has no knowledge of its wrong, the principal should
indemnify the agent. But see DuPuy v. Crucible Steel Co., 288 F. at 585.
18. 173 Misc. 106, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
19. The suit never reached trial at all since one of the charges in the complaint was
dismissed initially and the other dismissed for failure of proof. Id. at 107. 16 N.Y.S.2d at 846.
20. Id. at III, 16 N.Y.S.2d at 849. However, there is a subtle benefit which exists, since
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As a result of this indication, demands rose for legislation to remedy
the result and soon thereafter the first statutory provisions on
indemnification were enacted.
B. Post-Statutory Common Law
Since the McCollum case and the resulting statutory reaction, the
trend in those jurisdictions still relying upon the common law2' has'
been away from the McC'ollum benefit rule and in( favor of
reimbursing the innocent director2 In fact, one could conclude from
studying the law in these jurisdictions that even if no statutes had
been enacted to remedy the injustice and confusion of the McCollum
decision, the law would have developed in a similar manner. For
example, two years after McCollum, a New Jersey court in Solin ine
v. Hollender,"3 despite finding that a corporate benefit did exist, 4 held
that such a benefit was not essential where directors had prevailed in a
stockholder's suit and allowed recovery of litigation expenses on the
basis of the sound policy of "inducing responsible businessmen to
accept the post of director. 25 However, the court did emphasize that
there could be no reimbursement prior to the director's vindication,
thus making ultimate acquittal the test with the corporation
maintaining a completely neutral role until that time.2 6 Similarly
indemnification benefits the corporation by inducing the best men to serve as directors and officers.
See Bishop, supra note 3, 20 Bus. LAW. at 839.
21. There are seven states which have no statutory provisions for indemnification. These
states are Alabama, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, New Hampshire, Oklahoma and Vermont.
22. The changing attitude of the courts was recognized by the court in Mooney v. Willys-
Overland Motors, 204 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1953), which commented: "'We note merely that
although the earlier cases dealing with the subject are divided, a more favorable attitude among
judges and other writers has been developing in recent years." It is perhaps no accident that
this favorable attitude has coincided with the increasingly strict interpretation of executive
liability standards. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
23. 129 N.J. Eq. 264, 19 A.2d 344 (1941). Since this case, New Jersey has enacted an
indemnification statute, but the case is frequently cited by common law jurisdictions to support
the granting of indemnification. See, e.g., In re E. C. Warner Co., 232 Minn. 207, 45 N.W.2d
388 (1950).
24. The benefit was based upon the fact that "'in defending themselves they demonstrated
to the investing public the honesty of the corporate management and thus they did not alone
serve their own interests but also a duty which they owed to the beneficiaries of the trust-the
stockholders." Solimine v. Hollender, 129 N.J. Eq. 264. 271, 19 A.2d 344. 347 (1941).
25. Other policy grounds mentioned by the court included the fact that indemnification
enabled a director of limited means to engage counsel and that indemnification was likely to
discourage stockholder litigation of the strike variety. Id. at 272, 19 A.2d at 348.
26. Id. at 266, 19 A.2d at 345. As support for this proposition, the court quotes: "There
is a vast difference between letting the director fight the battle at his own expense with
reimbursement if he is vindicated-and using the power of the corporation to aid in the fight
[ V OL. 22
LEGISLA TION
about ten years later, another court echoed the Solimine theory that
the ultimate result of the litigation was controlling and that where the
director was successful on the merits, reimbursement was clearly
necessary due to the "sound public policy favorable to the
development of sound corporate management as a prerequisite for
responsible corporate action. 2 7 Continued development of a law
favorable to the director is evident in a recent case which indicated
that the corporation no longer must maintain its neutral position and
can make advances where "the interests of the corporation,
considered apart from the respective interests of the individual
defendants therein, were so injuriously threatened or involved as to
justify it in retaining and paying counsel to protect its interests.
' 2
Thus, although there is no meaningful case development in
jurisdictions relying upon common law indemnification, it is
submitted that the results in those jurisdictions would be strikingly
parallel to those in jurisdictions with a statutory provision. Certainly
the McCollum benefit theory has been abandoned, and decisions
appear to rest upon the same public policy considerations evident in
many statutory provisions.
I II. STATUTORY REACTION
The McCollum decision led directly to the passage of statutes in
many states. These early statutes may be divided into two basic
groups, though within each group there may appear slight variations
in approach.29 The first group includes those statutes which grant the
before it is shown whether or not he is a faithful servant who deserves indemnity. . . .The rule
under discussion is designed to produce fair play-to prevent the plaintiff from being
overwhelmed by the company's financial power before the real defendants have shown their guilt
or innocence." Washington, supra note 2, at 438. But see International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
Hoffa, 242 F. Supp. 246, 253 (D.D.C. 1965), which suggests that it is equally as clear that if the
corporation's own interests lie on either side, it must aggressively defend such interests.
27. In re E. C. Warner, 232 Minn. 207, 214-15, 45 N.W.2d 388, 393 (1950).
28. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Hoffa, 242 F. Supp' 246, 253 nA6 (D.D.C. 1965),
citing Kirby v. Schenck, 25 N.Y.S.2d 431, 433 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
29. Other authors have asserted that only two types exist: "Those which have the power
to indemnify personnel for litigation 'expenses in certain situations and those which give a
statutory right to indemnification in certain situations." Comment, Corporations
IndenmniJication oJ Management .or Litigation Expenses, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1030-31
(1954); Bishop, supra note 3, at 1069. Additionally these authors make the confusing suggestion
that some states such as New York have both types of statutes. It is submitted that a more
useful analysis would divide the approaches on the basis of the absence or presence of non-
exclusive language. Furthermore, those statutes such as New York's may be better understood
as a unique hybrid of the exclusive and non-exclusive dichotomy and should be examined apart
from those statutes which are wholly exclusive or non-exclusive.
19691
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corporation the power to indemnify certain personnel against expenses
incurred in suits'" except where such persons are adjudged "liable for
negligence or misconduct in the performance of duty."' 3 All these
statutes include, however, non-exclusive language indicating that
notwithstanding such limitations, the corporation may by appropriate
action indemnify its personnel to any extent it wishes. The second
group, with far fewer statutes, includes those which either lack non-
exclusive language or which are expressly made exclusive, thus
limiting indemnification to the situations described in the statute.:
The most important distinction between the two groups is the
existence or omission of this non-exclusive language, for if a statute
includes such language, the restrictions in the statute apparently may
be exceeded by appropriate corporate or stockholder action.
Clearly one must study the good and bad points of these older
statutes and their variants before considering in detail the two most
recently developed approaches. However, a detailed discussion of the
older statutes' mechanics would be repetitively burdensome for the
reader, :3 since many of the mechanics are included in the two recent
statutes which are analyzed in detail in Part V. Thus, the following
discussion is limited to the most troublesome area within the older
statutes-the non-exclusive language and the maximum extent to
which a company may indemnify its personnel under such language.
A. The 1953 Delaware Statute
The starting point for any discussion of statutory indemnification
must be the 1953 Delaware statute, since its language has been
adopted by the majority of all states having such provisions. 3  This
30. A major naw in these statutes is that there is no distinction between derivative actions
and actions not in the right of the corporation. See notes 97 & 98 inJra and accompanying text,
31. Thes6 statutes were patterned after the 1953 Delaware statute and the 1960 Model
Business Corporation Act which was copied substantially from the Delaware act. See DEL,
CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 122(10) (1953); I MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 4(o) (1960). For a
complete list ofstatutes following the Delaware language, see note 34 inlra.
32. Initially the 1947 California statute was the model used by states following this
exclusive type statute which provided for narrow indemnification under court control. Very few
states have adopted this approach. See note 58 hi/ra. A few other states have borrowed from
this approach but eliminated the court control by merely stating the grounds under which the
corporation had the power to indemnify. See note 59 inJra.
33. For an excellent summary of the varying characteristics of these early statutes, see I
MODEL Bus. CORP. AT ANN. § 4(o). 2.03, at 147-51 (1960).
34. Today 23 states out of 43 states having indemnification provisions are patterned for
the most part after the 1953 Delaware statute and the 1960 Model Business Corporation Act.
These states are Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
['v ot.. 22
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statute provided that every Delaware corporation shall have the power
to:
Indemnify any and all of its directors or officers . . . against expenses actually
and necessarily incurred by them in connection with the defense of any action,
suit or proceeding . . . except in relation to matters as to which any such
director or officer . . . shall be adjudged in such action, suit or proceeding to be
liable for negligence or misconduct in the performance of duty. Such
indemnification shall not be deemed exclusive of any other rights to which those
indemnified may be entitled, under any by-law, agreement, vote of stockholders
or otherwise.",
The intention of the legislature was plainly to provide the corporation
with the power to indemnify its directors or officers without the
necessity of a by-law in every instance except where the insider had
been "adjudged . . . liable for negligence or misconduct in the
performance of duty." However, if the last sentence (the "non-
exclusive" clause) is to be given any effect, it would seem that the
legislature must also have intended to allow the corporation to
provide for even broader indemnification. Yet despite this apparently
clear authorization, it would be unrealistic to think any court would
permit the corporation to roam unchecked in the indemnification
field. 6
Unfortunately there are few cases under this statute or a statute
of a similar type which have involved an attempt to indemnify
corporate insiders. Moonel" v. Willis-Overland Motors, lnc.,3 the first
case to involve the statute, indicates that certain policy restrictions
limit the extent to which a corporation may indemnify under a bylaw
its directors or officers. This case involved an action to recover under
Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. For
citations of these statutes, see note 4 supra. With the exception of Iowa, Maryland, and
Massachusetts, whose statutes depart from the literal language of the 1953 Delaware statute
while achieving the same result, all the above states have adopted the Delaware language without
any major change. For a discussion of a recently recommended change in the Maryland statute
to provide for advance indemnity, see Sebring, Recent Legislative Changes in the Law oJ
Indemnification oJ Directors, Oflicers, and Others, 23 Bus. LAW. 95, 107 (1967).
35. DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 122(10) (1953).
36. See generallr G. WASHINGTON & J. BIsHoP, supra note 3. This book alone has
profably shaped the thought in the indemnification area more than any other factor, and its
main message is perhaps that the non-exclusive language cannot be taken literally and excessive
abuse of it will be checked by public policy. In commenting upon this Delaware section, the
authors stated: -[Ilt is intrinsically unlikely that many courts will be predisposed to construe
such a statute in a manner which would drastically alter the common law's equitable limitations
upon the indemnification of insiders whose innocence is dubious, or not even dubious." Id. at
118.
37. 204 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1953).
19691
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a contract which provided that if the plaintiff terminated his
employment as president of the corporation, the corporation would
indemnify the plaintiff according to its bylaw for expenses in suits
currently pending. The bylaw38 was broader than the statute in that it
permitted indemnification for the cost of unsuccessful defenses and
reasonable settlements and excluded expenses only where the insider
was adjudged by a court or independent counsel to be "derelict in the
performance of his duty."39
In holding that the contract and bylaw were valid and in granting
the plaintiff indemnification, the court commented:
We think that Delaware Corporation Law § 2(10) and Willis' By-Law XXIII
have met the requirements of public policy by the realistic limits they set upon
the right of indemnification. We do not think that public policy requires that the
Delaware statute be construed as controlling every conceivable situation which in
one aspect may be called indemnification for litigation expenses, any more than
the policy of ultra vires should be applied to invalidate those other payments
under the contract which, except for the contract, would be gifts. Where there
exists, as there does here, an independent ground for the payment of litigation
expenses, we see no reason to make an overriding reference to the statute ...
We see no danger here of encouraging non-meritorious claims for
indemnification outside the by-law and the statute. An independent legal ground
for such claims must be shown in every case.40
From this language it would seem that the corporation in forming its
indemnity bylaw must meet the needs of public policy by setting
"realistic limits" on the rights to indemnification." The only hint
presented to define those limits, however, is the broad reference to
"non-meritorious" claims, indicating that a bylaw which encouraged
such claims would exceed the permissible limits.
The few other cases which have involved the statutes provide little
38. For the text of this bylaw, see 204 F.2d at 891 n.5.
39. "Derelict" for the purpose of this bylaw may be defined by the concluding proviso to
mean "wilful misfeasance, bad faith, gross negligence or reckless disregard of the duties involved
in the conduct of his office." See G. WASHINGTON & J. BisHop. supra note 3, at 118-19. If
construed in this manner, it is obvious that the bylaw is broader. However, it is submitted that
the two provisions could be read independently with the "derelict" standard being a somewhat
lesser standard than the one in the concluding proviso, in which case the bylaw may not be as
broad as suggested.
40. 204 F.2d at 896.
41. Professors Washington and Bishop have commented: "The reference to meeting the
requirements of public policy by setting 'realistic limits' on the right to indemnification probably
means that the court would have voided, as against public policy, an agreement to reimburse a
director who had been adjudged liable to the corporation for negligence or misconduct. . . . [Ilt
would be unsafe to rely upon the opinion as authority for the proposition that indemnification
may properly be granted in all situations which might seem to be covered by the Willys bylaw."
G. VASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, supra note 3, at 120-21.
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or no guidelines to aid in ascertaining the limits of Delaware's public
policy with regard to indemnification. In Essential Enterprises Corpora-
tion v. Automatic Steel Products, hnc.Y'2 directors who successfully
contested the majority shareholders' attempt to oust them recovered
indemnification from the corporation. This bylaw was identical to the
Delaware statute except that it made indemnification mandatory. The
Chancellor in relying upon the Mooney decision stated:
I believe my construction of the statute and implementing by-law tends to
promote the desirable end that corporate officials will resist what they consider
to be illegal removal action, secure in the knowledge that their reasonable
expenses will be borne by the corporation they have served if they are
vindicated 3
Thus, despite no language in the bylaw limiting indemnification to
vindicated directors, the court indicated that such a limitation would
most likely be placed upon such a bylaw. Clearly, however, directors
and officers may be indemnified in situations where they are not
vindicated. For example, where no negligence to the corporation is
involved, but only questionable misconduct to a third party, a strong
case for indemnification may exist.
In Lssential Enterprises v. Dorser Cotporation4 the court avoided
the opportunity to decide whether the statute without a bylaw would
have permitted indemnification of those directors or officers who had
settled out of court. The court held the bylaw controlling, and it
specifically excluded indemnification not only where the director was
"finally adjudged" liable for dereliction of duty, but also where there
was a "compromise of any such liability."45 The court, avoiding the
choice between a construction which did violence to the legislature's
explicit wording and one which would permit the indemnification of
probably guilty insiders, commented that "[a] corporation is free to
invoke less than all the indemnification power granted it under this
particular statute, thus the by-law governs here."46 From this decision
it is clear that the corporation can limit the right of indemnification
granted by the statute to any extent, but it remains uncertain how far
a corporation may go the other way in indemnifying its directors and
officers.
One recent decision involving a Delaware corporation vividly
42. 164 A.2d 437 (Del. Ch. 1960).
43. Id. at 441-42 (emphasis added).
44. 182 A.2d 647 (Del. Ch. 1962).
45. Id. at 652.
46. Id. at 653.
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demonstrates the probable reaction of courts to a bylaw which
indemnified directors or officers in all circumstances. In Teren v.
Howard47 shareholders were successful in a derivative action against
several officers and directors for ordinary negligence and misconduct.
When the action was started, the board of directors immediately
passed a resolution indemnifying all directors and officers for
everything. The court, however, refused to permit any indemnification,
holding the offense to be within the "negligence or misconduct"
provision which prohibited indemnification. The court made no
mention of the "non-exclusive" clause and of the attempted
resolution. Professor Bishop made the following comment on the
absence of any language in the court's opinion dealing with the "non-
exclusive" clause:
It dealt with the non-exclusive clause of the Delaware statute, which on its face
would seem to say that this resolution entitled them to indemnification, in an
extremely simple way. It ignored it. My guess is that that is about what any
court would do in such a situation. So I would not place great reliance on the
seeming unlimited permissiveness of the statutes of the Delaware variety48
One other interpretation of the "non-exclusive" clause is possible.
The clause could be construed as being subject to the "negligence or
misconduct" provision; in other words, the corporation could enact
any bylaw except one which indemnified its directors or officers for
negligence or misconduct. However, no case has construed the "non-
exclusive" clause as being subject to the "negligence or misconduct"
provision.
Decisions in other jurisdictions having similar statutes are scarce
and of little aid in defining the bounds of public policy 9 Nevertheless,
it is clear that there are judicial limits on indemnity, no matter how
liberal legislatures have been. One example of perhaps typical judicial
reluctance to permit indemnification apparently authorized by statute
may be seen in the recent case of SEC v. Continental Growth Fund.0
There a director of a mutual trust fund registered under the
Investment Company Act of 1940 and incorporated in Maryland
47. 322 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1963).
48. Bishop, supra note 3, 20 Bus. LAW. at 842.
49. For an excellent and detailed analysis of what these bounds of public policy might be,
see G. WASHINGTON & J. BisHop, supra note 3, at 201-03. The outline they present is designed
to present the outside limits on indemnity, yet even they admit that "conceivably,
indemnification might go a little farther without shocking the court's conscience too severely."
Id. at 203.
50. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,437 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). See Bishop. Insurance Against
Liabilities oJ Directors and OJficers, 22 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 342, 355 (1967).
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sought reimbursement for expenses in an action in which he had been
adjudged guilty of ordinary negligence in permitting the company to
be looted by another director. The Maryland indemnification
provision was cast in the same non-exclusive Janguage as the
Delaware statute,5 1 and the company had a charter provision pursuant
thereto entitling a director to indemnification except where "adjudged
liable because of wilful misfeasance, bad faith, gross negligence or
reckless disregard of duties involved in the conduct of his office."
'52
Additionally, this charter provision specifically complied with the
limits of permissible indemnification set out in section 17(h) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940753 Nevertheless, the court denied
reimbursement on the ground the the director's right to
indemnification depended not on being adjudged "grossly negligent"
as provided in the charter and in the Investment Act, but rather on his
being adjudged guilty of "negligence or misconduct" as provided in
the Maryland statute. To achieve this result, the court refused to
include the charter provision within the non-exclusive language of the
Maryland statute. The court reasoned that a charter provisior was
not specifically mentioned and could not be placed within the "or
otherwise" part of the clause, since "[s]uch a catch-all shelter is
hardly an adequate haven for the lax standards of indemnification
voted by the directors in their own benefit." 4
The Continental Growth case vividly demonstrates the extent to
which a court will go to deprive what it considers to be an unworthy
director of indemnification clearly authorized by a statutory
provision. The decision surely must be as disturbing as McCollum for
it reeks with uncertainty and the injustice of judicial abrogation of
legislative intention.
From the preceding examination of case authority, it is evident
that though enacted in a majority of states, the 1953 Delaware statute
does not provide a satisfactory solution to the problems of the
common law and in fact has created a greater sense of uncertainty,
since courts brazenly disregard statutory language to deny
indemnification in cases which under some common law authority
would have been close5  One additional factor contributing to the
51. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 64 (Supp. 1968).
52. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,437, at 94, 722.
53. Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(h) (1964).
54. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,437, at 94,723.
55. For example, if the Continental Growth situation had resulted from pure corporate
indemnity outside of any by law or statute, it is doubtful that reimbursement would have been
denied under the rationales of Solimine and the Teansters cases. See notes 23 & 28 supra.
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uncertain status of the law under such statutes is the scarcity of
judicial authority. It is clear that several companies have adopted very
permissive bylaws pursuant to the non-exclusive language, yet there
have been no judicial decisions involving these bylaws5 Apparently if
indemnity has been made under these bylaws, it most likely has not
been made known to the stockholders where a challenge appeared
likely or has been made with the full knowledge and approval of all
the stockholders.
B. Other Statutory Reaction
In contrast to the pattern established by the 1953 Delaware
statute and its imitators, the other group of statutes is marked by the
absence of non-exclusive language, though within this group there are
several different approaches 7 Additionally, these statutes are more
complex, representing a more realistic effort to meet the myriad of
considerations in indemnification.
One approach within this group is patterned after the 1947
California statuteW8 These statutes are phrased in exclusive language
and grant corporate personnel the right to indemnification, but only if
the defendant is successful or has settled with court approval and only
if the court finds that his action "fairly and equitably" merits
indemnification.59 By placing indemnification under court control, this
type of statute attempts to avoid the uncertainty which exists with the
56. For example, National Steel Corporation, General American Investors Company, and
Northern States Power Company have adopted permissive bylaws. G. WASHINGTON & J.
BISHoP,supra note 3, at 18 1.
57. See note 29 supra.
58. CAL. CORP. CODE § 830 (Supp. 1968-69). Subsection (f) was added to section 830 in
1957 to provide separate standards for suits not in the right of the corporation.
59. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-309 (1966); CAL. CORP. COO § 830 (Supp. 1968-69);
N.C. GEN.. STAT. §§ 55-19 to -21 (1965); S.C. CoDL ANN. §§ 12-12.2(18). 12-18.18 (Supp. 1968).
Specifically the language states that expenses can be assessed against the corporation by the
court if both: "(1) The person sued is successful in whole or in part, or the proceding against
him is settled with the approval of the court. (2) The court finds that his conduct fairly and
equitably merits the indemnity." North Carolina and California to permit indemnification
outside of court approval but only in the case of suits not in the right of the corporation and the
above standards apply to derivative suits. California also added in 1968 subsection (h) to § 830
to permit corporate-paid indemnity insurance against liability arising from either type of suit.
This significant amendment eases the strict recovery burdens that exist under this statute for the
director or officer. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 830(f) (Supp. 1968-69); N.C. GN. STAT. § 55-20(3)
(1965). South Carolina has broadened the standards in the derivative suit by phrasing the
requirements in the alternative, thus effectively eliminating the first requirement. See S.C. Cook
ANN. § 12.18.18 (Supp. 1968). (J. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-320 (Supp. 1966), which is
not specifically exclusive but which contains no non-exclusive language and follows the South
Carolina pattern of phrasing the above requirements in the alternative.
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non-exclusive language of the Delaware type statute. However, the
same public policy problem remains in the requirement that the court
find that the defendant's conduct "fairly and equitably" merits
reimbursement. In a sense, this approach codifies what actually
happened under the 1953 Delaware statute; that is, in both cases the
court will assess the whole situation and grant indemnification only if
it feels the case falls within the limits of public policy. Yet clearly it is
a more thoughtful statute and makes two significant advances. First,
it removes the potential abuse which existed where executives could
determine their own limits and places the determination in a far better
agency, the courts6 Second, it indicates that two situations may exist
with respect to indemnification-the successful defense and the
settlement-though it stops short of making the needed distinctions
between the two. Thus, though not without faults, this approach does
make meaningful steps toward a better solution.
Another statutory approach -achieves exclusiveness not by express
language but by omission of any non-exclusive language and the
resulting presumption that the statute is conclusive. There are two
variations of this approach. Some states remove the indemnification
problem from corporate consideration by statutorily conveying a right
of indemnification to corporate personnel not adjudged liable for
negligence or misconduct in the performance of their duties. At the
same time, these provisions grant the corporation great power by
permitting reimbursement of compromise settlements if a neutral
board of directors approves the settlement, having determined no
negligence or misconduct." Other states leave the power of
indemnification with the corporation, but impress it with limitations
60. It may be urged that it is unwise to transfer the power of indemnification from the
corporation to the legislature and the judiciary, since the non-exclusive language provides a
flexibility needed to meet the particular needs of a particular corporation. However, it is
submitted that indemnification is better suited for legislative and judicial control, since the non-
exclusive language paves the way for nefarious indemnity which would clearly violate public
policy if it were ever challenged. With definite standards, the limits of indemnification are better
defined while court control provides it with flexibility to meet the hard cases. For a discussion of
other advantages of exclusive language, see note 96 infra and accompanying text. Note that the
1968 California amendment regarding indemnity insurance may well provide a means of
avoiding the legislative and judicial control contained in the previous act.
61. Ky. REV. STAT. § 271.375 (1962); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 15-2204(o) (1967). C.
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 351.385(10), 351.355 (1966). Neither the Kentucky statute nor the
Montana statute contains exclusive or non-exclusive language; therefore, each statute
presumptively pre-empts the area.. While granting the director or officer the right to
indemnification, the Missouri statute differs from the Kentucky-Montana pattern in that it is
phrased in nonexclusive language and requires court approval for indemnity in the settlement
situation.
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substantially more severe and definite than those in the Delaware
statute." Although both types attempt to provide a thorough answer
to the complexities of indemnification, much of their effort seems
misguided. The first group of statutes unthinkingly opens the door to
the most flagrant possibilities of abuse by permitting fellow directors
to approve a compromise outside of judicial control, and this will
undoubtedly precipitate the uncertainty which accompanies a court
striking down an abuse as against public policy. The second type,
though more precise, still does not treat the many complexities
thoughtfully.63
One outstanding example of misguided legislation is the 1966
Arizona statute.64 This provision, going the other direction from the
1953 Delaware statute by broadening the standards, permits the
corporation to indemnify directors and officers to any extent if
authorization exists in the articles or bylaws and if the board of
directors determines in "good faith" that the defendant did not act
with "gross negligence" or with "fraudulent or criminal intent." 5 In
its attempt to favor management, the legislature has created a horror
of potential misuse and perhaps as a result has necessitated a narrow
construction by the judiciary to fit the statute within the bounds of
public policy. Surely such legislation should be avoided and more
thoughtful solutions found to balance the policy of favoring
indemnification with that of protecting the corporate treasury from
unjustified plunder.
The most thorough and complex statutes, each presenting an
approach of its own, were adopted by New York in 19635 and by
62. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.13(14) (Supp. 1968); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.10(I) (1963). ( /.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E) (Baldwin Supp. 1967). Florida adopted the 1953 Delaware
statute but deleted the non-exclusive language. Presumably it is exclusive and allows indemnity
in each case except where adjudged guilty of negligence or misconduct. The Michigan statute
contains the same language as the Florida statute except that to restrict indemnity in the
settlement situation it includes in the excepted language matters settled by agreement predicated
upon the existence of liability. Ohio's statute provides even stricter limitations upon the power of
the corporation to reimburse its directors or officers but is phrased in nonexclusive language
even though it departs substantially from the Delaware pattern.
63. Obvious faults lie in the Florida and Michigan statutes; for example, neither
adequately provides for the compromise situation or for advance payments. Each of these early
statutes suffers from a common error of treating the complicated subject of indemnification in
too simple a statute.
64. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-198 (Supp. 1968).
65. Id.
66. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 721-26. Tennessee has recently adopted legislation
substantially based upon the New York indemnification provisions and is the only other state to
adopt the New York approach. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-407 to -411 (Supp. 1968). Other states
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Delaware in 1967.67 These statutes, being the best and most
comprehensive solutions to date, will be analyzed in greater detail
later in Part V, in an effort to extract the best characteristics of both
for inclusion in a proposed model statute.
IV. NON-STATUTORY REACTION
A. Liability Insurance
Due to the uncertainty of both legislative and judicial reaction to
the limits of proper indemnification, many corporations have
concluded that a better means of protecting their directors and
officers lies with liability insurance. 8 The typical insurance purchased
is in reality a package deal of two policies. 9 The first, usually called
the "Reimbursement" policy, provides that the insurer pay on behalf
of the corporation those amounts it must pay due to a bylaw, a court
order, or otherwise by law. The second, usually entitled the
"Directors and Officers Liability" policy, permits the direct
indemnification of those executives by the insurer in those situations
where due to an omission in a bylaw or requirement of law the
executives may not look to the corporation for indemnification.70
have adopted limited parts of the New York law. See. e.g.. GA. CODE ANN. § 22-717(h) (1968);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-5(7) (1969).
67. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1967). Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Kansas are the only
other states to have adopted the language of the new Delaware statute, which was copied from
the new indemnity section of the Model Business Corporation Act. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-
3010 (Supp. 1968); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 410 (Supp. 1968); 'VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-3.1
(Supp. 1968); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 4A (1967). Georgia and New Jersey have
substantially adopted the new Model Act language but have added a few modifications. GA.
CODE ANN. § -22-717 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-5 (1969). See note 66 supra.
68. Insurance firms handling indemnity policies have reported a phenomenal increase in
1968 sales. For example, Employers' Group of Boston sold 40 policies totaling nearly 200
million dollars during the first half of 1968, as compared with only 22 policies totaling 110
million dollars in all 1967. Carley, supra note 7, at I, col. I. Some firms have adopted
aggressive advertising policies which vividly project the expanded scope of potential directors and
officers liability. See. e.g., full page ad of American Home Assurance Company, Wall St.
Journal, January 27, 1969, at 9. For a detailed examination of the advantages and disadvantages
of liability insurance see, e.g.. Bishop, supra note 3, 22 Bus. LAW. 92 (1961); Brook, OJficers
and Directors Liability Insurance, 2 THE FORuMi 228 (1967); Hinsey & De Lancey, Directors and
OJficers Liability Insurance-An Approach to its Evaluation and a Checklist, 23 Bus. LAW.
869 (1968); insurance Against Liability oJ Directors and Officers-A Forum, supra note 3;
Mace, supra note 8; Note, Liability In.uranceJor Corporate Eecutives. 80 HARV. L. Rv. 648
(1967); Note, Public Policy and Directors' Liability Insurance, 67 COLUNI. L. REV. 716 (1967).
69. The standard form used is the Lloyd's of London policy. Note, Liability InsuranceJbr
Corporate Executives, supra note 66, at 649-50 n.l 1. For a detailed analysis of the protection
provided by the Lloyd's policy, see Hinsey & De Lancey, supra note 68. Some American firms
offering such coverage are the St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company, the Travelers
Insurance Company and the Kempers Insurance Group. Green, supra note 5, at 8, col. 2.
70. For a discussion of these types of policies, see Mace, supra note 11, at 48.
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Most state statutes prohibit the corporation from indemnifying
the director where he is adjudged guilty of negligence or misconduct,
but very few regulate the purchase of liability insurance which under
the "Directors and Officers Liability" policy could accomplish the
same result.7 1 In this connection a serious policy question has arisen,
since due to the great expense of the premiums 2 many corporations
underwrite the burden of the premium expense either by increasing
executive compensation to cover the cost or by paying the premium
itself.7 3 It is argued that if the corporation could not directly
indemnify the executive by a bylaw due to local law restrictions, it
should not be allowed to circumvent the state law by purchasing
liability insurance for the executive.74  In an apparent effort to meet
this objection, many companies allocate 90 per cent of the premium ex-
pense to the corporation as that attributable to the "Reimbursement"
policy and 10 per cent to the executive as that attributable to the "Di-
rectors and Officers Liability" policy.75 However, even the 90 per cent-
10 per cent allocation is subject to suspicion, since many companies un-
doubtedly finance the 10 per cent through increased executive compen-
sation.76
71. Most policies exclude certain liabilities from coverage. However, Lloyd's policy would
apparently permit a negligent director to recover since it specifically covers "wrongful acts"
committed by the insureds in their roles as directors and officers. Intentional misconduct is for
the most part excluded. Note, Liability Insurance or Corporate Executives. supra note 68, at
650.
72. The largest policy which provides 25 million dollars in coverage for the executives of
General Motors Corporation costs about $450,000 for a three year period. Carley, supra note 7,
at I, col. I. Premiums on smaller policies run between $2000 and S2500 per year for each S500,000
coverage. Green, supra note 5, at 8, col. 2.
73. Where the executive pays the complete premium, the legality question has been some-
what milder, focusing only upon the policy issue of whether such insurance undermines the liability
the law seeks to impose and is thus void. Most commentators however view this problem to be of
minimal significance. See. e.g.. Note, Liability Insurance Jor Corporate 1"'xecutives. supra note
68, at 651-53.
74. Bishop, supra note 3, 22 Bus. LAw. 92 (1967); Bishop, supra note 3, 22 RtcoRD
OF N.'.C. B.A. at 355. See also Mace, supra note I1, at 50.
75. The 90'-10"r allocation is the standard only due to practice and is
unsupported by reliable data. The rationale for the use of these figures is well stated as follows:
"This allocation is supported by the idea that the great majority of suits against directors and
officers will be successfully defended and indemnification for expenses incurred in defending the
action will be [legally] obtained from the corporation which, in turn, will seek reimbursement
from the insurer under the 'Reimbursement' policy." Mace, supra note 8, at 50-51. Some
corporations do in fact pay 100o of the premium; for example, the Comptroller of the Currency
has ruled that national banks may do so. Id. at 51, citing NATIONAL BANK Rrv. 116 (Sept.
1965).
76. The greatest danger to the executive who accepts increased compensation designed to
pay his 10' is a stockholder's derivative suit to require that person to pay his fair share
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Although there have been no cases decided on the point, the
validity of indemnity throughi insurance purchased by the corporation
seems doubtful under the Continental Growth rationale,7 1 which could
easily be extended to the insurance situation which achieves the same
result prohibited by that case. It is submitted, however,that to
conclude that the purchase of insurance violates public policy because
it achieves results which would be outside public policy if done by
bylaw indemnification is to ignore the distinguishable qualities of
insurance and indemnification 58 Liability insurance for directors is
very similar to other types of professional insurance79 and can be
justified as part of the executive's compensation protecting him
against future liability which has not arisen. On the other hand,
indemnification cannot be so considered, since payment is predicated
on a determination of liability or. on a settlement in which case the
corporation, not some third party, must reimburse the executive.'" In
one instance, the corporation merely pays a premium, which may be
analogized to the life insurance premium many corporations pay for
their executives, while in the other case the corporation may have to
reimburse the executive for amounts which were awarded the
corporation due to an adjudged wrong of the executive. Thus,
insurance should be viewed as executive compensation and should be
permitted to be purchased by the corporation without resorting to the
90 per cent-10 per cent fiction.
Even if one assumes the validity of corporate payment, there are
other problems which must be considered. For example, insurers
anxious to avoid any litigation which might question the validity of
liability insurance are very cautious as to whom such policies are
of the premium costs. Moreover, the executive incurs the risk that the insurance company, which
raced with a large loss, will refuse to pay upon the ground that such an increase in compensation
to pay the premium voids the policy as a matter of public policy. Id. at 52. The latter risk seems
minimal, since if an insurance company pursued such a defense, it is doubtful if it would be in
business for very long thereafter.
77. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
78. A similar analysis was made in Note, Liability Insurance Jbr Corporate Executives,
supra note 68, at 667.
79. One author has analogized the mistrust of directors' liability insurance to the
reluctance with which attorney's malpractice insurance was initially viewed. Brook, supra note
68, at 228-29. The same analogy could reasonably be made with insurance for doctors and other
professionals.
80. This distinction is crucial in the derivative suit, since the corporation would be
reimbursing the executive for the very amount paid to the corporation as a result of the suit;
whereas, in the insurance situation, the corporation would keep its recovery and a third party
insurance company is the one who must reimburse the losing defendant.
.1969]
VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW
offered and reject over one-half the applications due to poor risk.',
Furthermore, a recent study of the advantages of coverage over the
costs of such insurance indicates only minimal advantages exist in
providing coverage beyond that which a corporation may give via
indemnification.8 2 Yet except for the company where chances are
highly remote that any of its personnel will have need of indemnity, it
is suggested that insurance should be purchased as supplementary
protection to that provided by indemnification bylaws. Such insurance
does offer the unique and important advantage of protecting the
executive where indemnification is prohibited by local law as well as
avoiding the uncertainty which surrounds the indemnification statutes.
Furthermore, insurance provides a more secure protection to the
executive who may be concerned about falling out with management
or about the corporation's inability to pay. 3 But such advantages
could be nullified by a narrow view of the validity of corporate
payment of insurance premiums. It is therefore essential that future
statutes take their cue from the realistic approach of the 1967
Delaware statute& and specifically grant the corporation the power to
purchase insurance.
B. Resignation oJ Directors
The rise in stockholder's suits and the increasing awareness of the
liabilities which may result therefrom has had the disturbing effect of
deterring many able men from service as corporate directors as well as
causing the resignation of some. Many who resigned or who have been
deterred feared that pressures of other affairs would prevent them
from being adequately informed of the company's activities and thus
would increase the possibility of their liability in a suit based upon
acts of which they were unaware!' Several corporations have sought
81. The Wall Street Journal reports that "they turn down at least half the applications
they get, because the companies, or the executives for whom the coverage is sought, don't appear
to be good risks." Green, supra note 5, at 8, col. 2. Companies which are most likely to be
turned down are in industries that are prime targets for antitrust or securities actions, such as
steel. Carley, supra note 7, at 1, col. I.
82. Insurance Against Liability oJ Directors and OJJicers-A Forum, supra note 3, at
368. For a helpful checklist to determine if liability insurance would be beneficial in a particular
case, see Hinsey & De Lancey, supra note 68, at 879-83.
83. For a complete list of the unique advantages of liability insurance, see Brook, supra
note 68, at 235-37.
84. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (1967). In 1968, California added a similar
subsection to its statute authorizing corporate paid indemnity insurance. CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 830(h) (1968).
85. Green, supra note 5, at 8, col. 3. Set, generally Gartner, "'Thanks But ... " Wall Street
Journal, March 13, 1969, at I. col. 6.
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to protect such fringe directors by naming them "advisory" directors
in hopes of distinguishing them from the "full" directors who are
liable to suit. 6 Yet undoubtedly well-qualified executives have been
influenced by the state of flux existing in the law of indemnification.
The answer lies in well-reasoned legislation in which the judiciary will
have sufficient confidence to respect the obvious meaning of the
statute, thus eliminating the fear and uncertainty that now pervades
the area.
V. THE BEST STATUTORY SOLUTIONS-A COMPARISON
The New York statutes, though copied only by a single state,'
7
presents a far more realistic solution than any of its contemporaries,
including the 1953 Delaware statut e. The comprehensive nature of the
New York law undoubtedly caused the -drafters of the Model
Business Corporation Act to reassess the adequacy of the original
Model Act provision, which had been copied from the 1953 Delaware
Code, and to conclude that a more thoughtful section was needed88
Their work resulted in adding to the Model Act in April of 1967 a
new indemnification section to supplant the old one. 9 Immediately
thereafter Delaware and five other states adopted language almost
identical with that of the new Model Act section.' (For comparison,
this group will be referred to hereinafter as the 1967 Delaware type
statute.)
These two recent statutory provisions represent the most
sophisticated and comprehensive legislation enacted to date, yet
neither appears to provide a solution able to cope with the needs of
86. The Wall Street Journal reports Litton Industries as one company which has sought
to protect outside directors by naming them "advisory" directors. Id. Professor Bishop has long
advocated a dual standard of liability for the "inside" director and the "outside" director,
which if adopted, would alleviate this problem. See. e.g.. Bishop. suprt note 3, 22 Bus. LAW. 92,
102 n.37 (1967).
87. Tennessee recently adopted the New York language in its indemnification section. See
note 64 supra. It is submitted that the reason many states have shied away from the New York
approach is the fact that the statute is exclusive and severely limits the corporate power to
indemnify, and thus many corporations undoubtedly have lobbied against the passage of such a
statute. Some states, such as Kentucky, Michigan, and Missouri, do have similar provisions
with respect to settlements but depart from the whole pattern.
88. Sebring, supra note 34, at 96.
89. Section 4A was approved on April 22, 1967, by the Committee on Corporate Laws of
the Section of Corporate, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association. For the
official reporting of the revised section, see Sebring, .mtpra note 34, at 95.
90. DIj:i. Comi: ANN. tit. 8. § 145 (1967); GA. Comi. ANN. § 22-717 (1968); KAN. Gl.N.
STAT. ANN. § 17-3010 (Supp. 1968): N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-5 (1969): PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 410 (Supp. 1968); \/'A. CODE ANN. § 13.1-3.1 (Supp. 1968).
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the modern corporate executive. The following comparative analysis
of the two approaches is designed to provide a fuller understanding of
the characteristics of the proposed model statute which follows. To
aid the reader in comparing these characteristics, a chart comparing
the 1953 Delaware type statute followed by a majority of states, the
1967 Delaware type statute, the New York statute, and the proposed
model statute has been prepared and is included in the article as
Appendix A.
A. Exclusiveness
Despite the confusion and criticism which resulted from the non-
exclusive language in the 1953 Delaware statute, the drafters included
the same non-exclusive language i,n the 1967 Delaware type statute."'
Mr. Orvel Sebring, Chairman 'of the ABA Committee which
originally drafted this new provision, makes the following comment
on the retention of the non-exclusive language:
This provision . . . was intended to do what it says: to enable corporations to
adopt additional indemnification provisions if deemed necessary. In view of the
express wording of the statute, it is difficult to see why a court would not enforce
a by-law provision, reasonable in its terms, which might go beyond the scope of
Section 4A or Section 145 2
Although this explanation was justifiably applicable (though
unworkable due to severe judicial reluctance) to the 1953 Delaware
statute, it is suggested that it is unjustifiable when considered with the
comprehensive nature of the 1967 Delaware type statute. As Mr.
Sebring continues, the "statutory provisions alone, being self-
executing, are sufficient,"" and one might add to his statement that
they are sufficient without the aid of any non-exclusive clause. A
further indication that the provisions are "complete" is his suggestion
that any existing bylaw less liberal than the new provisions should be
repealed."4 Surely the same rationale would apply to a more liberal
bylaw which would come much closer to violating legislative intent
and judicial public policy. Indeed so comprehensive is the nature of
this statute that it would be difficult to exceed its scope without
breaking the bounds of judicial public policy which, despite the non-
91. DiJi. CoD.,\Nx. tit. 8. § 145() (1967).
92. Sebring, supra note 34, at 105.
93. Id. at 106.
94. Id. This concern apparently arises from cases which have held that bylaws which are
more restrictive than statutory standards are controlling. See, e.g.. Essential Enterprises v.
Dorsey Corp., 182 A.2d 647 (Del. Ch. 1962).
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exclusive language, would undoubtedly be controlling. Thus, it is
submitted that the non-exclusive clause adds nothing to the well-
designed, comprehensive statute and in fact minimizes its effectiveness
by injecting an element of uncertainty as to how far the courts will
permit the corporation to go under it.
In contrast to the Delaware type statutes, the New York statute
is completely exclusive, forbidding any indemnification inconsistent
with its terms. 5 In addition to providing greater certainty as to the
limits of permissible indemnification, the exclusive approach has
several other significant advantages. First, it provides a certain
amount of uniformity and predictability in the indemnification rights
of corporate personnel. Any area so closely tied with public policy
that courts ate willing to override clear legislative intent should seek
uniform application of the law. Surely a non-exclusive clause can
never achieve that aim, as it encourages a diverse "bylaw by bylaw"
application since each corporation is free to place in its bylaws any
provision it wishesY6
Second, the exclusive language is a more effective means to
implement public policy. The non-exclusive language lends itself to
indemnification under bylaws which grossly violate the bounds of
public policy but which may never be challenged due to stockholder
apathy or lack of notice. On the other hand, the exclusive statute
defines the limits of public policy in the statute itself and prohibits
any indemnity inconsistent with those limits.
Third, the exclusive statute need not abrogate the corporate
freedom which defenders of the non-exclusive statute say can exist
only if the corporation can indemnify outside the provisions of the
statute. If the exclusive statute has been broadly drafted, then any
provision outside its limits would be prohibited-by public policy.
Additionally, the corporation should still have the freedom to choose,
since the statute should merely grant the power to indemnify within its
limits and should not be mandatory as a whole.
Thus it is suggested, as it is provided in the proposed statute, that
the exclusive language be used. It should be noted, however, that
where such language is used, it is essential that the other provisions be
carefully drawn to the outer limits of public policy. It is only in that
95. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 721 (1963).
96. Even Mr. Sebring who advocates the use of non-exclusive language strongly agreed
with the need for a more uniform approach and has commented: "A more uniform approach is
desirable, which is not possible under a system through which indemnification is provided on a
corporation-by-corporation by-law basis." Sebring, supra note 34, at 99.
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manner that the policy favoring the protection of the corporate
executive can be adequately balanced with the policy prohibiting
unjustifiable corporate expenditure.
B. Type of Actions Covered
The majority of statutes do not distinguish between the
derivative suit and suits not in the right of the corporation- whether
civil, criminal or administrative-and prescribes the same standard of
conduct for both types.17 Clearly, however, different policy
considerations are involved and should be recognized, as has been
done in both the New York statute and the 1967 Delaware type
statute.9 Even at common law, courts recognized that a lesser
standard should be applied to suits not in the right of the corporation
on the theory that the relationship then becomes ruled by the law of
agency that the principal must indemnify its agent for losses which
are a direct consequence of the agency." Accordingly it makes good
sense to have a different standard. The derivative suit involves a
breach of fiduciary duty to the corporation itself, and as such,
reimbursement of amounts paid for 'its benefit should be strictly
controlled.'"" However, in a third party suit, such as a criminal or
civil antitrust action, the corporate executive may have been acting
with the best intentions to further the corporate interest and should
therefore be indemnified more readily than where he has breached his
fiduciary duty. The proposed model statute therefore has separate
provisions for the derivative suit and the suit not in the right of the
corporation.
C. Standard of Conduct
1. Suits Not in the Right of the Corporation.-Although most
early statutes were aimed toward indemnity in the derivative suit, the
rapid rise in potential suits by outsiders in the form of antitrust or
97. Connecticut was perhaps the first state to make this distinction. CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 33-320 (1961).
98. Compare DEL. C6DE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 145(a)-(b) (1967), with N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§§ 722, 723 (1963).
99. Du Puy v. Crucible Steel Co., 288 F. 583 (W.D. Pa. 1923); Hoch v. Duluth Brewing &
Malting Co., 173 Minn. 374, 217 N.W. 503 (1928). For a discussion of this agency theory and
these cases, see G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, supra note 3, at 106-08.
100. This need for strict control was partially recognized when the Model Act in 1959
amended its original section copied from the 1953 Delaware section by adding the words "to the




securities suits has focused attention upon the need for a lesser
standard in situations involving actions not in the right of the
corporation. Without question the successful director or officer should
be indemnified and both statutes have so provided, 0' but with respect
to the executive who is less successful or who has compromised, each
statute differs slightly. Under the 1967 Delaware type statute, the less
successful person may be indemnified against all amounts paid,
including judgments as well as expenses, only if he:
acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not
opposed to the best interests of the corporation and, with respect to any criminal
action or proceeding, had no reasonable excuse to believe his conduct was
unlawful.'
Such indemnification may be made by a majority vote of a quorum
of disinterested directors if it exists, by independent legal counsel, or
by the stockholders. 1°3 This standard was adopted from the similar
New York language but adds the "not opposed to" wording to cover
the case where a director or officer engages in a completely personal
transaction in which he believes the corporation has no interest."" The
New York statute, however, provides greater protection, in that if the
corporation refuses to indemnify the executive, as where the executive
has lost favor with management, he may apply to the court for
indemnification which may be awarded despite the adverse corporate
action.'05
The standard used by both statutes recognizes the policy
distinctions from the derivative suit, yet there still are some trouble
spots for the "honest but dumb" director. The standard may cut him
out, since it requires that he act in a manner he "reasonably" believes
to be in the best interests of the corporation. The reasonableness
requirement has an objective flavor, and to inject a more subjective
standard for the innocent director the proposed statute requires only
that he "honestly" believe his actions to be in the corporation's best
interests. Similarly, reimbursement may be prohibited because,
101. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (1967); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 724(a) (1963).
102. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (1967).
•103. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(d) (1967); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 724(b) (1963).
The proposed model provision has added the Executive Committee since in many corporations it
is the managing body.
104. One writer states that these words were specifically added "to cover the possibility or
a case brought because of the status of the person concerned (i.e., a director or officer, etc.)
based on acts in an individual capacity such as were involved in the Texas Gull Sulphur case."
Sebring, supra note 34, at 102.
105. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 725 (1963).
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although an executive may be able to show that his conduct was in
good faith and in the best interest of the corporation, he may have
had "reasonable cause to believe" his conduct was unlawful."' Thus,
to avoid such a contingency as well as to recognize the need for
liberality in an exclusive statute, the proposed model statute adopts a
broader standard and permits indemnification if there is a finding in
any criminal action or proceeding by the court or by appropriate
corporate action that the individual "fairly and equitably merits
indemnification."'
0 7
2. The Derivative Suit.-As with the non-derivative suit, the
problem arises only with the unsuccessful director or officer, since the
successful one is and should be indemnified.'"' But as to the less
successful person, the statutes impose far stricter standards of conduct
and limit indemnification to expenses. Moreover, unlike the non-
derivative action, separate standards tightly control settlements.
The New York statute has the simpler, though more prohibitive,
standard, permitting reimbursement of expenses in all cases except
where the director or officer has been "adjudged to have breached his
duty to the corporation."'0 9 The 1967 Delaware type statute, on the
other hand, applies initially the same subjective good faith standard as
in the non-derivative suit and then excepts situations where the
director or officer has been "adjudged to be liabl; for negligence or
misconduct in the performance of his duty to the corporation" unless
a court determines despite such an adjudication that he is "fairly and
reasonably" entitled to indemnification." 0 Both use the same
procedure for judging the executive's conduct as in the non-derivative
suit, except that Delaware by including the "unless" clause gives
some sanction to court control though there is still no procedure by
which an executive not so adjudged can apply for judicial
indemnification.
The conflicting policies are clear, yet they defy easy solution. All
would agree that there should be no indemnity where a director or
officer has so violently breached his fiduciary duty as to be guilty of
106. One author has in fact concluded that given modern antitrust concepts it would be
very difficult to convince a court that a defendant director or officer -had no reasonable cause
to believe that his conduct was unlaful.'" See I-olk, (orporation Stanute: 1959-1966. 1966
DUKE L.J. 875. 907.
107. This language has been borrowed from the California indemnity provision. CAt.
CORP. CODE § 830(a) (2) (1947).
108. See note 101 supra and accompanying text.
109. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 722(a) (1963).
110. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8. § 145(b) (1967).
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actual dishonesty, willful misconduct, or gross negligence. But the use
of mere negligence or misconduct as the standard raises disturbing
questions. For example, Professor Bishop has urged that such terms
are not restrictive enough and that therefore some executives have
been spared loss when their conduct would have prohibited
indemnification under an objective public policy."' Yet, on the other
side, these terms embrace such an endless variety of harmful activity
that their use often results in an improper denial of indemnification.
There is no room to distinguish deliberate misconduct from that done
with good intentions. Nor may negligence which results from a
violation of a well-established duty be distinguished from that in
violation of a newly announced duty with an uncertain scope." 2 Nor is
there opportunity to impose a different standard on the advisory
fringe director, as distinguished from the inside director. 13 The only
means of providing the flexibility needed to cope with these differing
situations is to establish a broader standard and to place the
determination of whether the standard has been met under judicial
control. Surely this determination in a derivative suit can be made
more appropriately by a disinterested judiciary than by directors who
will be compassionate in judging their fellow director. The 1967
Delaware type statute moves in this direction but requires a judgment
of negligence or misconduct before judicial determination comes into
play. Thus, it is submitted that the wiser course is to opt for the
broader standard of the New York statute and to place its
determination in the hands of the judiciary. This creates a more
restrictive standard, while at the same time providing the flexibility
necessary to handle the hard case.
Additionally, there may be cases where money judgments against
I l. See generall.r Insurance Against Liabilities of Directors and Olficers-A Florui,
supra note 3, at 354.
112. Professor Folk emphasizes this point well in the following comment: "[A] new rule
of fiduciary duty can be evolved more readily and declared more boldly if the court can, in an
appropriate case, grant indemnity in whole or in part for conduct concededly unethical but not
legally wrong at the time, and thereby avoid a heavy judgment retrospectively imposed upon an
individual for the first time. This aids the court caught between the Scylla of holding no breach
of duty under existing law, and the Charybdis of exacting a possible crushing personal liability
for disregarding an ethical concept which was not then but should now be a legal standard."
Folk, supra note 106, at 910-11. CJ. British Companies Act, I I & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38, §§ 136, 448
(I) (1948), which provides for placing the burden of expense upon the corporation in such a
case.
113. Bishop, supra note 3, 22 Bus. LAW 92 (1967). Mr. Sebring notes that such a
distinction should exist but fails to explain how the Model Act has provided for it. Sebring,
supra note 34, at 104.
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the director or officer should not be borne by him but by the
corporation, as where he acted on legal advice given by corporate
counsel. Thus, the proposed model statute permits the reimbursement
of judgments and amounts paid in settlement as well as the expenses
involved. The potential for abuse is limited since the extent to which
indemnification can be awarded is controlled by judicial discretion. In
such a case, there is no reason to limit recovery to expenses as does
the 1967 Delaware type statute.
D. Mandatory Indenifjication
Both statutes require indemnification where in either a non-
derivative or a derivative suit the defendant was successful "on the
merits or otherwise,"'1 though New York does require him to have
been "wholly successful.
' " 5
The policies favoring mandatory indemnification are twofold.
First, where a defendant has been vindicated, he is presumed free from
fault, and thus indemnity will violate no public policy. Second,
compulsory indemnification protects the person who has won the suit
but lost the battle due to his being in disfavor with management who
would otherwise refuse to indemnify him. True, he could apply to
court under the proposed statute and eventually be reimbursed, but
since under the premise of the first policy there is no public policy
question involved, it is better to provide for extra-judicial means.
Although mandatory indemnification for the successful director is
supported by persuasive policies, it is suggested that contrary to the
policy of the Delaware and the New York statutes, it does matter
whether the director was successful on the merits or otherwise. It is
not always true that the director who wins "otherwise" deserves
indemnification, since the director who wins by default judgment or
other technicality may in fact be as guilty of breach of fiduciary duty
as the director who loses on the merits."' Thus, mandatory
indemnification should be limited to those persons successful on the
merits, leaving those otherwise sucessful, whose conduct may raise
114. DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (1967); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 724(a) (1963).
115. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 724(a) (1963). The word "wholly" could easily be
discarded as surplusage.
116. One court has indicated approval of such a construction and has held a defendant to
be adjudged guilty for indemnity purposes though the suit was dismissed. Diamond v. Diamond.
307 N.Y. 263, 120 N.E.2d 819 (1954).
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Since many of the suggestions discussed rely heavily upon the use
of judicial discretion, it seems beneficial to focus briefly upon the
reasons behind its use. First, access to the judiciary for reimbursement
protects the director or officer who has been unjustifiably refused
recovery by his fellow directors or stockholders. Second, judicial
determination helps prevent the hard case where, although a person
has breached the prescribed standard, he fairly and reasonably
deserves indemnification. Third, the use of the judiciary to make such
determinations insures fairness and equality that a similar
determination by sympathetic directors could not guarantee. Finally
by allowing ad hoc determinations, the use of judicial discretion
enables the law of corporate indemnity to adapt more easily to the
changing needs of modern society. Thus, one may conclude that the
greatest advantage of the use of judicial discretion is that it lends a
flexibility to indemnification statutes which under the old model were
rigidly attached to a single standard.
F. Types of Personnel Covered
New York and a majority of the older statutes limit their
coverage to "directors and officers," leaving other employees to their
uncertain common law rights.118 Delaware, however, has expanded the
coverage to include a "director, officer, employee or agent" of the
corporation, thus subjecting the employee and agent to the same
statutory standards as the director or officer."' The problem may
appear largely semantic, since anyone who is not a director or officer
is not likely to be involved in a non-derivative or derivative suit, yet it
becomes very real where an executive is both an officer and an
employee. 20 In such a situation, it is argued that as an employee he
117. Clearly this needed check does not impose a harsh burden upon those who win on a
technicality since if their conduct deserves indemnity, board approval will be automatic in both
the derivative and non-derivative situation. Furthermore, if the board for personal reasons
refuses to grant indemnity, the party always has another route through the courts.
118. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 721 (1963). The 1953 Delaware provision also limited its
scope to "directors and officers."
119. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 145(a)-(b) (1967).
120. Professors Washington and Bishop ask the following questions: "Finally, what
happens if, as is often the case, a particular executive is both an officer and an employee, e.g.,
vice president and general manager of the Widget Division? Can he, in his employee capacity,
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could contract for broader rights than are available under the
statutory provisions. It seems doubtful in light of the common law
that such "broader rights" would be permitted to exceed the limits of
public policy. However, to avoid the uncertainty that extra-statutory
coverage would raise, the wiser course seems to be the inclusive
Delaware coverage. There is no apparent reason why the employee or
agent should not be held to the statutory standards, especially since
chances are slim that they will ever be faced with the problem.
The Delaware statute also includes anyone "serving at the
request of the corporation as a director, officer, employee or agent of
another corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust or other
enterprise,' 2' while New York permits indemnity in this subsidiary
director situation only in the non-derivative suit.' Such a distinction
seems untenable, since the subsidiary director involved in a derivative
suit should be judged by the same standards as the parent director.
Thus, the proposed model statute follows the inclusive Delaware
language in both the derivative and non-derivative situations.,"
G. Expenses
The term "expenses," the only sum awarded under the 1953
Delaware type statute, has been ambiguously construed. Some took
the broad view that the term included judgments, fines and attorneys'
fees, while others limited its meaning to fees and costs. 24 The 1967
Delaware type statute and the New York statute correct this
ambiguity by precise language and rest the extent of indemnity upon
the type of action involved. Under the New York statute recovery in a
contract for a broader right of indemnification than that spelled out in the statute? If he cannot.
and i] the courts regard the statute as leaving to the employees and agents full freedom to
contract for indemnification, here may be a reason for eschewing the prestigious but otherwise
empty title of vice president." G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, supra note 3, at 155-56,
121. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 145(a)-(b) (1967).
122. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 723(a) (1963). The language of the New York statute in
the non-derivative situation is less specific than its counterpart in the Delaware statute, since it
includes any director or officer who has "served in any capacity at the request of the
corporation."
123. An additional provision must be made for the person who has retired or died prior to
indemnification. The right to indemnity should survive either his death or retirement, but most
statutes overlook the need to protect this right for his estate or for himself on retirement. The
proposed statute protects the retired person by the use of the "is or was" language of the 1967
Delaware provision and the estate of the dead person by including "heirs, executors or
administrators" in the scope of coverage.
124. Compare G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, supra note 3, at 128, with Folk, spra note
106, at 905.
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derivative suit includes "reasonable expenses, including attorneys'
fees, actually and necessarily incurred by him," while recovery in a
non-derivative suit includes "any judgment, fines, amounts paid in
settlement and reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, actually
and necessarily incurred."'2 Delaware adopted the same language,
with the exception of substituting the word "reasonably" for
"necessarily" and omitting the word "reasonable" preceding
expenses.' 6 The less stringent standard was adopted due to the
difficulty of proving that expenses were "necessary '1 27 and is clearly
an improvement.
The proposed model statute departs from the New York-
Delaware pattern and allows full recovery in the derivative suit
including amounts paid in settlement. There are strong contrary
policy arguments, however, which-must be met. Most authorities
suggest that to permit such indemnity in the derivative suit produces a
"circuity of payments" and nullifies the preventive force of the
derivative suit.28 This result would be quite true if the model statute
did not require judicial authorization of any indemnity in derivative
suits. Thus, the derivative suit retains its force since the judiciary will
be likely to grant full recovery only in those exceptional cases where
the expenses should be justly borne by the corporation. Moreover, by
allowing payment of settlement amounts with court approval, the




The majority of the older statutes did not include a separate
provision for the settlement situation, but relied upon a broad
interpretation of the term "expenses" to include settlement payments
in indemnification.1 3  However, equating the settlement situation with
125. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 722(a), 723(a) (1963).
126. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 145(a)-(b) (1967).
127. Connecticut was the first state to make this change and it has been suggested that the
reason was the extreme difficulty in proving that particular past expenses were necessary.
Manning, The 1961 Anendments to the Connecticut Corporation Acts, 35 CONN. B.J. 460. 466
(1961). See also, Folk, supra note 106, at 905 n.181.
128. Bishop, supra note 3, 20 Bus. LAW. at 843 (1965); Sebring, supra note 34, at 103.
129. Contra Sebring, supra note 34, at 103.
130. This attitude may be best exhibited by the following comment of the drafters of the
Model Business Corporation Act: "The reference in the Model Act to 'expenses actually and
reasonably incurred' should be held to cover settlement payments if the corporation has been
advised by counsel that the suit was without substantial merit and that the settlement payments
did not exceed the probable expenses of litigation." I MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 4 4.03. 160
(1960).
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the judicial trial case ignores the totally different policy considerations
involved. On one hand there is the strong policy favoring settlements
as a means of avoiding court congestion and protracted litigation,
while on the other hand there is the policy against encouraging strike
suits brought solely for their harrassment value.13' The latter would be
violated by awarding indemnity for all settlements since this would
undoubtedly encourage directors not to vindicate their actions against
groundless claims. Moreover, general indemnification in the settlement
situation would frustrate the standards of the statute since any person
who thought he might be adjudged liable for breach of duty to the
corporation would seek a settlement as quickly as he could thus
maximizing the possibility of his indemnification. For these reasons, a
few statutes, including both the New York and the 1967 Delaware
type statutes, have special provisions for indemnity in settlement
situations. 32 Both the New York and Delaware statutes adopt a strict
view, prohibiting the indemnification of amounts paid in settling a
derivative suit even if approved by a court, while allowing recovery of
expenses incurred in settling a derivative suit if the requisite standard
of conduct was met and, in the case of New York, if approved by a
court. 3 3 In the non-derivative suit, however, the policies against
indemnity are not as strong and full recovery is permitted by both
statutes . 4 Limiting recovery to expenses appears unjustified where
strict judicial control is imposed. Thus, the proposed model statute,
while more lenient in allowing recovery of amounts paid in settlement
as well as expenses, is stricter by requiring a judicial determination
that one "fairly and reasonably" merits indemnity to the extent
sought. In this manner, both policies are served, since settlements
where justified are encouraged, while judicial controls guard against
misuse of the settlement route.
I. Advance Payments
None of the earlier statutes provided for payments of expenses
prior to final termination of the suit, and therefore many successful
131. For an analysis of these conflicting policies behind settlements, see Note, Attorney's
Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie? 20 V'AND. L. REV. 1216 (1967).
132. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 145(a)-(b) (1967); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 722(b), 723(a)
(1963).
.133. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (b) (1967); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 722(b)
(1963). The Tennessee Legislature in adopting the New York language intentionally omitted this
prohibition, though the printed editions of the new Act have incorrectly included it. TENN. CoDE
ANN. § 48.407(2) (Special Supp. 1968).
134. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (1967); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 723(a) (1963).
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defendants found their assets stripped by the expenses of lengthy
litigation, even though they later were reimbursed. The need for such
a provision is crucial, since a defendant forced to rely upon personal
funds may be prevented by expenses from presenting the best case to
vindicate his action. Yet there must certainly be means of controlling
the use of advance payments. Both the New York statute and the
1967 Delaware type statute allow advances but require approval by a
disinterested board, or if none, by independent counsel, or by
stockholders. 3 5 Moreover, the defendant must repay to the
corporation any amounts to which he is not entitled .3 Although there
is no concrete evidence indicating how well these controls work, this
statutory pattern appears well-reasoned and in harmony with sound
policy. Thus, the proposed model statute has adopted that pattern,
except that interest is added to the amounts repaid to avoid any
unjustified interest-free loan and that approval may be made by the
Executive Committee, which is the controlling body in many
corporations today.
J. Insurance
As discussed in Part IV, liability insurance has become an
increasingly popular and effective means of supplementing bylaw
indemnification despite the doubt which exists as to the extent to
which a corporation may purchase such insurance. Most statutes,
including the New York statute, are not helpful since no reference is
made to insurance. Those who would deny the corporation the power
to purchase insurance argue that the purchase of insurance permits
the corporation to circumvent indemnification bylaw restrictions since
the final results are similar,' 37 but as was asserted earlier, this
reasoning ignores the special nature of insurance. Thus, in accordance
with the earlier conclusion that the purchase of insurance is sound
policy, the model provision follows the 1967 Delaware type
provision '1 8 which grants the corporation the power to purchase such
insurance.
135. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(e) (1967); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 724(c), 725(c)
(1963).
136. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(e) (1967); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 726(a) (1963).
137. For these views, see note 74 supra and accompanying text.
138. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (1967).
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K. Notice to Stockholders
One reason that has been suggested for the lack of judicial
authority on the proper limits of indemnification is the fact that many
cases of improper reimbursement have gone unchallenged merely due
to lack of stockholder notice. This result must be avoided, yet very
few statutes require any kind of notice, 31 and surprisingly the
otherwise comprehensive 1967 Delaware type statute fails to include
this important means of protecting the corporate interest. Even the
SEC disclosure requirements do not adequately provide notice, since
their effect is limited to the situation existing at the time when the
indemnification bylaw was adopted. " " New York, however, does
require notice of the persons paid, the amount paid and the nature of
the litigation at the time paid."' Such a provision is necessary to
provide full protection to the corporate coffers and therefore has been
adopted for inclusion in the proposed model statute.
VI. THE PROPOSED MODEL STATUTE
The following statute has been drafted to reflect the conclusions
reached in Part V. It is not intended to be an end in itself, but is
intended to stimulate ideas which may develop into a statute better
adapted to modern corporate conditions. There must not be, as
occured with the 1953 Delaware statute, a blind apathetic acceptance
of the recent Delaware and Model Business Corporation Act
provisions, and the search for a better solution must continue. With
these thoughts in mind, the following statute is submitted for examina-
tion.
139. California, one of the first states to have a provision for notice to the stockholders,
required a court order to call the notice provision into effect. CAL. CORP. CODE § 830(c) (1947).
140. Professors Washington and Bishop suggest that the SEC could do much more than it
does to implement public policy as to indemnification and conclude as follows: "in short,
although the SEC almost certainly has power under the 1933 and 1934 Acts, particularly
Section 7 of the former and Sections 13 and 14 of the latter, to require that corporations subject
to these Acts routinely inform their stockholders of actual indemnification of insiders, it has
thus far made little use of this power. Stockholders have, of course, other methods of getting
information as to the activities of management, but probably none so effective as the disclosure
process of the federal securities acts." G. WASHINGTON & J. BisIloP, supra note 3. at 243-44.
141. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 726(c) (1963). Georgia adopted this provision in its new
indemnity section, though it followed the 1967 Delaware language in every other respect. GA.
Con,- ANN. § 22-717(h) (1968).
LEGISLA TION
MODEL STATUTE
Indeninification of Corporate Personnel
(a) No provision made to indemnify a director, officer, employee or agent (and the heirs,
executors or administrators of such person) of the corporation for expenditures connected with the
defense of any civil, administrative or criminal action, suit or proceeding, or in connection with
any appeal relating thereto, whether contained in the charter, the bylaws, a resolution of the stock-
holders or directors, a contract, an agreement, or otherwise, shall be valid unless consistent with
this section.
(b) A corporation shall have the power to indemnify any person (and the heirs, executors
or administrators of such person) who is made or is threatened to be made a party to any
action, suit or proceeding, or to any appeal relating thereto, other than by or in the right of the
corporation, whether civil, criminal or administrative, by reason of the fact that he is or was a
director, officer, employee or agent of the corporation, or is or was serving at the request of the
corporation as director, officer, employee or agent of another corporation, partnership, joint
venture, trust or other enterprise against judgments, fines, amounts paid in settlement, and
expenses (including attorneys' fees) actually and reasonably incurred as a result of such action,
suit, proceeding or appeal if such person acted in good faith for a purpose which he honestly
believed to be in or not opposed to the best interest of the corporation, and, in any criminal
action or proceeding, is determined to fairly and equitably merit indemnification. The
termination of any action, suit or proceeding by judgment, order, settlement, conviction, or upon
a plea of nolo contendere or its equivalent, shall not, of itself, create a presumption that the
person did not act in good faith and in a manner which he reasonably believed to be in or not
opposed to the best interests of the corporation, and, with respect to any criminal action or
proceeding, does not fairly and equitably merit indemnification.
(c) A corporation shall have the power to indemnify any person (and the heirs, executors
or administrators of such person) who is made or is threatened to be made a party to any action
or suit, or to any appeal relating thereto, by or in the right of the corporation to procure a
judgment in its favor by reason of the fact that he is or was a director, officer, employee or
agent of the corporation, or is or was serving at the request of the corporation as a director,
officer, employee or agent of another corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust or other
enterprise against judgments, fines, amounts paid in settlement, and expenses (including
attorneys' fees) actually and reasonably incurred by him in connection with such action, suit, or
appeal if he acted in good faith for a purpose which he honestly believed to be in or not opposed
to the best interests of the corporation and except that no indemnification shall be made in
respect of any claim, issue or matter as to which such person has been adjudged to have
breached his duty to the corporation unless and only to the extent that the court in which such
action or suit was brought shall determine upon application that, despite the adjudication of
liability but in view of all the circumstances of the case, such person ;s fairly and reasonably
entitled to indemnity for such expenses which such court shall deem proper.
(d) To the extent that a director, officer, employee or agent of a corporation has been
successful on the merits in defense of any action, suit or proceeding referred to in subsections (b)
and (c), or in defense of any claim, issue or matter therein, he shall be indemnified against
expenses (including attorneys' fees) actually and reasonably incurred by him in connection
therewith. Where such a person is successful otherwise than on the merits, unless ordered by a
court under subsection (f), he shall be indemnified against expenses (including attorneys' fees)
actually and reasonably incurred by him in connection therewith only if the board of directors
or executive committee determines his conduct fairly and equitably merits indemnification.
(e) Except as provided in subsection (d). any indemnification under subsections (b) and (c),
unless ordered by a court under subsection (f), shall be made by the corporation only as
authorized in the specific case upon a determination that indemnification of the person is proper
in the circumstances because he has met the applicable standard of conduct set forth in
subsections (b) and (c). Such determination shall be made (1) by the board of directors or by the
executive committee by a majority vote of a quorum consisting of directors or members of the
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executive committee who were not parties to such action, suit or proceeding, or (2) if such a
quorum is not obtainable, by independent legal counsel in a written opinion, or (3) by the
stockholders.
(f) Notwithstanding the failure of a corporation to provide indemnification, and despite
any contrary resolution of the board or executive committee or of the stockholders in the
specific case under subsections (d) and (e), indemnification may be awarded by a court to the
extent authorized under subsections (b), (c) and (d). Application therefor may be made in every
case, either:
(1) In the civil suit or proceeding in which the expenses were incurred or other
amounts were paid, or
(2) To a court in a separate proceeding, in which case the application shall set forth
the disposition of any previous application made to any court for the same or similar relief
and also reasonable cause for the failure to make application for such relief in the suit or
proceeding in which the expenses were incurred or other amounts were paid.
The application shall be made in such manner and form as may be required by the applicable
rules of court or, in the absence thereof, by direction of a court to which it is made. Such
application shall be upon notice to the corporation. The court may also direct that notice be
given at the expense of the corporation to the stockholders and such other persons as it may
designate and in such manner as it may require.
(g) Expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred in defending any action, suit or
proceeding may be paid by the corporation in advance of the final disposition of such action,
suit or proceeding as authorized in the subsection (e). When indemnification is sought by judicial
action under subsection (0, the court may require advance payment of reasonable expenses,
including attorneys' fees, during the pendancy of the litigation as are necessary in connection
with the proceeding, if the court shall find that genuine issues of fact or law are or have been
raised by the person seeking indemnification under subsection (f). In either case, before a person
may receive advance payment, he must file with the secretary of the corporation a notarized
written statement agreeing to repay such amounts, plus a reasonable amount of interest as
determined by the board of directors or by the executive committee, if such person is ultimately
found not to be entitled to indemnification, or if the expenses advanced exceed the
indemnification to which he is entitled.
(h) A corporation shall have power to purchase and maintain insurance on behalf of any
person who is or was a director, officer, employee or agent of the corporation, or is or was
serving at the request of the corporation as a director, officer, employee or agent of another
corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust or other enterprise against any liability asserted
against him and incurred by him in any such capacity, or arising out of his status as such.
whether or not the corporation would have the power to indemnify him against such liability
under the provisions of this section.
(i) If, under this section, any expenses or other amounts are paid by way of
indemnification otherwise than by court order or action by the stockholders, the corporation
shall, not later than the next annual meeting of stockholders unless such meeting is held within
three months from the date of such payment, and in any event, within fifteen months from the
date of such payment, send by first class mail to its stockholders of record at the time entitled
to vote for the election of directors a statement specifying the persons paid, the amount paid,
and the nature and status at the time of such payment of the litigation or threatened litigation.
[*V OL. 22
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